Contagion, Liberalization, and the Optimal Structure of Globalization

Joseph E. Stiglitz      Columbia University

Nobel Ödüllü, Dünya Bankası eski baş ekonomisti Amerikalı ekonomist Josep Stiglitz'in "Journal of Globalization and Development(2010, Vol.1) " da çıkan son makalesi "Contagion, Liberalization, and the Optimal Structure of Globalization" a aşağıdaki web adresinde formu doldurarak ücretsiz olarak ulaşmanız mümkün.

Abstract

Advocates of capital market liberalization argue that it leads to greater stability: countries faced with a negative shock borrow from the rest of the world, allowing cross-country smoothing. There is considerable evidence against this conclusion. This paper explores one reason: integration can exacerbate contagion; a failure in one country can more easily spread to others. It derives conditions under which such adverse effects overwhelm the putative positive effects. It explains how capital controls can be welfare enhancing, reducing the risk of adverse effects from contagion. This paper presents an analytic framework within which we can begin to address broader questions of optimal economic architectures.

Recommended Citation

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2010) "Contagion, Liberalization, and the Optimal Structure of Globalization," Journal of Globalization and Development: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2, Article 2.
DOI: 10.2202/1948-1837.1149




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